Between 1932 and 1945 the Japanese military raised a number of 'puppet' armies.
Introduction
Following the Kwantung Army's seizure of Manchuria in September 1931 and the creation of the supposedly 'independent' state of Manchukuo in March 1932, the need for a pliant military force to assist the Imperial Japanese Army in defending its new territorial gains became imperative. With the Soviet Union to the north, Soviet-backed Mongolian People's Republic to the northwest and an increasingly fractious Republican China to the south, the Kwantung Army, which in 1931 only comprised two divisions Manchukuo, the area abutting the region still nominally under Republican Chinese control, the Japanese authorities established the supposedly autonomous Mongolgoverned Xing'an province where they trumpeted a 'policy of rule of the Mongols by the Mongols' (Mōjin Mō-ji seisaku), even installing a Mongolian prince, Prince Sai, as head of the Xing'an regional administration.
5 Furthermore, the Japanese military
In January 1936, as part of its ongoing encroachment into the territory of the Republic of China, the Kwantung Army General Staff adopted 'Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō'
(Outline of policy towards Mongolia [the northwest]). 11 The plan reviewed the current military situation as seen by Kwantung Army planners, 12 and then outlined the military, political, economic and cultural measures to be taken to achieve Japanese control of Inner Mongolia, and especially the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, a stated objective of the army. Steps included the coordination of the Japanese agents within Inner Mongolia, in particular the Zenrin Kyōkai (Good Neighbour Association), which had been active in the region from 1934 onwards, providing locals with medical care. 13 The population of Inner Mongolia was beset at the time by an array of diseases, including eye disease and respiratory problems that would have precluded them from military service. 14 The January 1936 plan echoed earlier Kwantung Army reports that called for the provision of medical care to these people, as well as the development of the infrastructure of the region in the form of roads, schools and hospitals. Improvements to the infrastructure would undoubtedly have facilitated Japanese economic penetration there, while the construction of schools and hospitals was a way in which Japanese individuals and organisations could be infiltrated into the region. 15 All of these developments would indirectly benefit the Kwantung Army's planned encroachment.
After more than seven pages detailing the various non-military agents to be connected with Kwantung Army operations, the plan spelled out the proposed structure of an Inner Mongolian Army (Naimōgun). 16 This force was to be composed of two 'armies' (gun), each with a slightly different structure. The first army was to be made up of two cavalry 'divisions' (shi), each consisting of three 'corps' (dan) and a mortar company (hakugekihōtai). The 'corps' were broken down into three 'regiments' (ren) each of 120 men and equipped with two light machine guns per company, with an additional machine gun company (kikanjūren) equipped with four heavy machine guns.
If the plan followed Japanese Army structure at the time, and there is no reason to suspect that it did not, the heavy machine gun company would have numbered some 40 men, 17 giving each regiment in total some 400 men. This would have meant that one cavalry 'division' would have numbered around 1250 men, together with the mortar company, which with only six mortars numbered no more than 50 men. 18 The 'army' was also to have been equipped with a horse artillery unit with eight guns and a tank unit with 18 vehicles. The composition of the second 'army' was essentially the same, although it did not include the tank unit.
19
The decision by the Kwantung Army to structure the Inner Mongolian Army around cavalry units was probably based on a number of reasons. Firstly, given the vast size of Inner Mongolia, a cavalry-based force made greater sense militarily given the degree of mobility that was needed to respond to any threat. needed for the horse artillery units and tank unit that the armies were also to encompass.
These units, together with some form of headquarters component, would have accounted for at least a further 500 men, giving the planned army around 5,500
personnel. In addition to manpower, the intended supply of 36 light machine guns, 24
heavy machine guns and 12 mortars, together with the horse artillery and tank unit, would have made it a comparatively well-equipped 'puppet' force.
While it is not possible to state with certainty what weaponry the force received, as the plan was not that detailed, from examining period photos it is possible to suggest what the fully-equipped army might have looked like. In September 1937, for example, following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese press highlighted the role of the cavalry of the Inner Mongolian Army in the campaign. 25 The photo that accompanied the report showed two Inner Mongolian Army cavalrymen mounted on their sturdy horses and dressed in uniforms almost identical to those worn by the Japanese Army (see Figure 1 ). The only pieces of equipment that marked the men as not being Japanese soldiers are the brassard that can be seen on the upper left arm, presumably to indicate that the men were Mongols, and the bandolier and waist pouches for ammunitions, which were equipment common to Chinese troops of the period. A modern army requires trained officers and non-commissioned officers to direct it in battle, and those personnel were lacking. The need to develop such a cadre had 41 Upshur, 'Chang Hsueh-liang', 44-55. 42 Kawabe, 'Ichigaya yori Ichigaya e 3/7', 183-4. 43 Boyd, Japanese-Mongolian Relations, 154-5. 44 Holland, 'Death that saved Europe', 99.
been recognised at the beginning of the twentieth century, with at least one Inner
Mongolian prince establishing a military school staffed by Japanese military personnel at his banner administration. 45 The school was largely unsuccessful, however, and one of the first things the Japanese military had to do in the early 1930s was to dispatch a small group of Mongolian students to Japan to undergo military schooling. 46 These students then served as trainers at the military school at Zhangbei in Chahar that the Japanese military established and which by June 1936 had about 500 Mongolian youths undergoing training. 47 To effectively staff the planned army, however, this school needed to turn out 12 captains, 36 lieutenants and 108 noncommissioned officers of various grades, 48 something that would have been impossible to do in the amount of time available. Japanese Army infantry officer candidates undertook six to 11 months training at officers' school followed by service with a field unit on probation for four months, but this was usually after graduating from a military preparatory school, while
NCOs received 12 months of training at NCO school, but only after completing their basic training.
49
The Kwantung Army planners would have been fully aware of the time needed to train a reliable officer and NCO corps, and for them to proceed regardless is clear evidence of unrealistic expectations on their part. One possible source of trained personnel would have been from the Manchukuoan Army's Xing'an Brigade mentioned earlier, who, being predominantly Mongol and already trained, might have provided an ideal boost to the officer and NCO cadre of the fledgling Inner Mongolian Army. There was, however, no suggestion in the January 1936 plan that seconding personnel from 45 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, 10-11. 46 'Zenrin kyōkai nenpyō', 412. 47 
Conclusion
While the Inner Mongolian Army that the Kwantung Army envisioned in its January 1936 plan never came into existence, the plan illustrates the extent to which Japanese military officers connected with its development were willing to go in the pursuit of control of the region. In particular, the plan illustrates that the Kwantung Army was thinking, to some extent, about the changes that were needed in Inner Mongolia to facilitate the formation of the proposed army. While some might argue that the planned force was merely a 'pipe dream' and that there was never any likelihood of it actually eventuating, I believe this was not the case. The evidence that is available from photographs and film taken after July 1937 suggests that the Kwantung Army did continue to equip the Inner Mongolians, seeking to implement its January 1936 plan, even if the army that eventuated was not what had been initially envisaged.
The Kwantung Army had in mind a compact, well balanced force in terms of ratio of fire power to manpower. In the end, however, they were unsuccessful because of the 57 
